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The optimal tax treatment of housing capital 
in the neoclassical growth model 
Bank of Finland Research 
Discussion Papers 10/2005 
Essi Eerola – Niku Määttänen 




In a dynamic setting, housing is both an asset and a consumption good. But should 
it be taxed like other forms of consumption or like other forms of saving? We 
consider the optimal taxation of the imputed rent from owner housing within a 
version of the neoclassical growth model. We find that the optimal tax rate on the 
imputed rent is quite sensitive to the constraints imposed on the other available 
tax rates. In general, it is not optimal to tax the imputed rent at the same rate as the 
business capital income. 
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4 
Omistusasumisen optimaalinen verokohtelu 
neoklassisessa kasvumallissa 
Suomen Pankin tutkimus 
Keskustelualoitteita 10/2005 
Essi Eerola – Niku Määttänen 




Omistusasunto on sekä varallisuuserä että kulutushyödyke. Mutta pitäisikö asu-
mista verottaa kuten muuta kulutusta vai kuten muuta säästämistä? Täsä työssä 
tarkastellaan omistusasumisen laskennallisen tuoton optimaalista verokohtelua dy-
naamisessa yleisen tasapainon mallissa, jossa julkinen valta rahoittaa kulutus-
menojaan verottamalla työtuloa, kulutusta, asumista ja pääomavoittoja. Tutkimuk-
sen keskeinen tulos on, että asumisen optimaalinen verokohtelu riippuu voimak-
kaasti siitä, mitä muita veroinstrumentteja julkinen valta käyttää. Yleisesti ottaen 
ei ole optimaalista yhtenäistää omistusasumisen ja pääomatulon verokohtelua. 
 
Avainsanat: asuminen, pääomaverotus, optimaalinen verotus 
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The tax treatment of housing is an important ﬁscal question because housing
wealth constitutes a large share of all household wealth. A common view in
the public ﬁnance literature is that housing enjoys a tax favored status in most
western economies, mainly because the return to owner housing, the imputed
rent, usually goes untaxed while the return to business capital is taxed at a
relatively high eﬀective tax rate.1
Several studies have assessed the welfare consequences of a tax reform that
removes this tax favored status of owner housing by setting an equal tax
rate on the imputed rent and business capital income. Using quantitative
dynamic general equilibrium models, Gahvari (1985), Skinner (1996), and
Gervais (2002), among others, have shown that such a reform would lead to
substantial eﬃciency gains.2
While these previous studies show that the current tax status of housing
is highly distortionary, they do not aim to determine what the optimal tax
treatment of housing is and how it depends on the overall tax system. Of
course, it need not be optimal to tax the imputed rent at the same rate as
business capital income.3 Since the return to owner housing is a utility ﬂow,
it is not clear whether this return should be treated like other forms of saving
rather than other forms of consumption.
The previous studies also typically consider only steady state eﬀects of tax
reforms.4 As is often the case with dynamic optimal taxation, neglecting the
transition may give very misleading welfare results. Moreover, the optimal
tax rates are time varying and it is of interest to see how the tax rate on the
imputed rent should evolve over time. In this regard, housing and business
capital are diﬀerent in an interesting way. It is well known that tax rates on
business capital income tend to be very high during the ﬁrst periods of an
optimal tax reform. The tax rate on business capital income, however, cannot
exceed 100%, unless it takes the form of an unexpected capital levy. This is
because ﬁrms cannot be forced to operate capital for a certain loss. In contrast,
there should always be some demand for housing even with an extremely high
tax burden on it. This is true as long as the marginal utility from housing
services goes to inﬁnity as they go to zero. Consequently, there is no natural
upper bound on the tax rate on the imputed rent.
In this paper, we analyze the optimal tax treatment of housing in a
dynamic general equilibrium setting. We employ a version of the neoclassical
growth model with a representative household. Housing is introduced following
Greenwood and Hercowitz (1991). Although the model is relatively simple,
1See Hendershott and White (2000) for an international comparison of housing’s tax
status.
2Other studies that also consider the eﬃciency and welfare eﬀects of the tax favored
status of housing include Gahvari (1984), Slemrod (1982), Berkovec and Fullerton (1992),
Hendershott and Won (1992), Poterba (1992), and Bye and Åvitsland (2003). Turnovsky
and Okuyama (1994) focus solely on capital accumulation.
3Gahvari (1984, 1985) touches upon this issue and shows that the tax rate on the imputed
rent need not equal the tax rate on business capital income. However, he does not consider
consumption taxation nor labor income taxation.
4Exceptions are Skinner (1996) and Määttänen (2004).
7it captures the intertemporal savings-consumption decision and the general
equilibrium eﬀects of capital taxation that we are interested in.5
Formally, we analyze a Ramsey problem for a government that ﬁnances
government expenditure by taxing consumption, labor income, business capital
income, and the imputed rent from owner housing. The government is assumed
to be able to commit to future tax policies. The solution to the Ramsey
problem is a tax reform which is optimal given the initial state of the economy,
individual optimization, and the available tax instruments. This approach
takes transitionary dynamics properly into account.
We formulate the optimal taxation problem following the line of research
represented by Judd (1985), Chamley (1986), Jones et al (1997), and Atkeson
et al (1999), among others. Our analysis is particularly close to Coleman (2000)
in that in our benchmark case we allow for taxing consumption and impose
the constraint that the tax rate on labor income must be non-negative.6 Of
course, in our set-up the government disposes an additional tax instrument,
namely a tax on the imputed rent from owner housing. We also follow Coleman
(2000) in assuming that part of the tax revenues are distributed back to the
household.7
We ﬁrst present analytical results about the optimal tax structure. In the
benchmark set-up, in the long run, the optimal tax rate on capital income is
strictly negative and the optimal tax rate on consumption is strictly positive.
While we cannot determine the sign of the optimal long run tax rate on the
imputed rent, we can show that when the utility function is logarithmic, it
is strictly larger than the tax rate on business capital income. We also show
that the optimal tax treatment of housing capital relative to business capital
depends on both the availability of a consumption tax and the amount of
government transfers to the household. Assuming again a logarithmic utility
function, we can show that in the special case without consumption taxation
and government transfers, the optimal tax rate on the imputed rent equals the
optimal tax rate on business capital income, not just in steady state but also
during the transition.8
Our numerical results shed more light on the optimal tax structure. In
particular, we ﬁnd that in the benchmark case both housing and consumption
should be taxed at relatively high rates even in the long run. The optimal
tax rate on business capital income is slightly below zero. In this sense, our
5As far as we know, we are the ﬁrst to consider housing taxation as a part of an optimal
taxation problem in a dynamic general equilibrium set-up. Cremer and Gahvari (1998)
study the optimal taxation of housing in a very diﬀerent context. In their static model
with incomplete information, the government may use diﬀerentiated housing taxes so as to
separate between diﬀerent consumer types. See also Englund (2003) for general discussion
on housing taxation.
6As shown by Coleman (2000), in the absence of such a constraint the government can
obtain the ﬁrst best allocation. This issue will also come up in our analysis.
7As discussed in Coleman (2000), in the absence of this assumption, the optimal tax rates
would not be uniquely determined.
8Strictly speaking, this analytical result requires assuming that the non-negativity
constraint on labor income is now never binding. This was the case in our numerical
experiments.
8results are certainly consistent with the notion that the current tax treatment
of housing is far too generous.
We also evaluate the eﬃciency cost of not taxing housing. Given our
optimal taxation approach, we ﬁnd it natural to compute it by comparing
the welfare gains of optimal tax reforms with and without the possibility to
tax housing. In our benchmark speciﬁcation (with consumption taxes and
government transfers), the ability to tax housing increases welfare by about
two percentage points in terms of an equivalent consumption compensation.
This is about one third of the overall welfare gain of an optimal tax reform
when housing can be taxed.
We proceed as follows. In the next section we describe the economy. We
then analyze in section 3 the case where the government can use the full
set of linear taxes with the ability to tax leisure. In this case, it is easy to
characterize the optimal tax system essentially because the ﬁrst best solution
can be obtained. In section 4 we characterize the optimal tax structure under
various constraints to the set of available tax instruments employing the primal
approach to the Ramsey problem. We also consider brieﬂy a small open
economy version of the model. We present and discuss our numerical results
in section 5. We conclude in section 6.
2T h e m o d e l
We consider a deterministic model with an inﬁnitely lived representative
household that derives utility from the consumption of a consumption good,
housing services, and leisure. The production side consists of ﬁrms that employ
business capital and labor to produce output goods which can be turned into
investment and consumption goods. A government imposes ﬂat-rate taxes on
labor income, business capital income, imputed rent, and consumption.
2.1 Firms
Every period t, a representative ﬁrm employs business capital, kt, and labor,
nt, to produce output goods, yt. The production function is
yt = f(kt,n t). (2.1)
We assume that the production function features constant returns to scale and
that fkn > 0 for all k>0 and n>0.9 The ﬁrm’s ﬁrst-order conditions for
proﬁt maximization imply that the before-tax returns to business capital and
labor are given by their marginal productivities, that is,
rt = fkt − δk (2.2)
and
wt = fnt, (2.3)
9We denote ∂
∂ktf(kt,n t)=fkt and similarly for other derivatives throughout the paper.
9where δk is the depreciation rate of business capital. The output good may
be costlessly converted into consumption good, business capital, and housing
capital.
2.2 The household’s problem
A representative household is endowed with one unit of time every period. It
derives utility from consumption, c, leisure, 1 − n, and the stock of housing
capital, h. The periodic utility function is u(c,h,n). The utility function is
strictly increasing in consumption and housing and strictly decreasing in labor,
is strictly concave, and satisﬁes the Inada conditions.
This utility function can be interpreted as a reduced form of the preference
structure in Greenwood and Hercowitz (1991), where households derive utility
from the consumption of goods and services produced in the market and goods
and services produced at home, or ‘home production’. Home production
is created by combining housing capital and time not allocated to market
production.10







This is also the utility function employed in deriving our benchmark
quantitative results.
The household can use both housing and business capital as a savings





t−1u(ct,h t,n t) (2.5)









tht] ≤ 0 (2.6)
where






t =1− δh − τ
h
trt.
The tax rates on consumption, business capital income, imputed rent, and
labor income are denoted by τc, τk, τh,a n dτn, respectively. We set the price
10A more general formulation would allow for allocating time to ‘leisure’, ‘home
production’ and ‘market production’. For studies using this approach, see eg Gomme et
al (2001), Baxter and Jerman (1999) and McGrattan et al (1997). The two approaches
result in the same allocations under a logarithmic speciﬁcation. For more discussion on this
issue, see Greenwood et al (1995).
10of one unit of the consumption good in period 1 equal to one. The price
of period t consumption in terms of period 1 consumption is denoted by pt.
Lump-sum transfers from the government are denoted by g2. The parameter
δh is the depreciation rate of housing capital.
Housing taxation is based on the imputed rent, which is deﬁned as the
rental price of housing services. If rental markets existed, the return to rental
housing should equal the return to business capital. Thus, the rental price of
housing would be rt + δh, assuming that landlords pay for the depreciation
and that the tax rate on rental income equals the tax rate on business capital
income. The tax base for an amount ht of housing capital is the imputed rent
net of depreciation, ie rtht.11
The ﬁrst-order conditions of the household’s problem are
ct : β




t−1unt + λpt(1 − τ
n









kt+1 : pt − pt+1Rt+1 =0 (2.10)
where λ is the Lagrange multiplier for the household’s budget constraint.
2.3 Government
Each period, total government expenditure is g = g1 + g2 where g1 is public
consumption that does not aﬀect households at the margin and g2 denotes
transfers to the households. The budget need not be balanced on a period









t ntwt + τ
h
trtht − g] ≥ 0 (2.11)
2.4 Equilibrium
For a given sequence of tax rates, a competitive equilibrium consists of
individual policies and prices such that the individual policies solve the
household’s problem in (2.5) and (2.6), factor returns are given by equations
in (2.2) and (2.3), the government budget constraint in (2.11) is satisﬁed, and
the aggregate resource constraint
ct + kt+1 + ht+1 + g1 = f(kt,n t)+( 1− δk)kt +( 1− δh)ht (2.12)
is satisﬁed for all t.
11The tax rate on the imputed rent should be understood as the overall eﬀective tax
rate on housing. Alternatively, and equivalently, housing taxation could take the form of a
property tax.
112.5 Optimal taxation
The objective of the government is to maximize household welfare by






assume that the government takes as given the ﬁrst period tax rates on business
capital income and the imputed rent, τk
1 and τh
1. A si sa l w a y st h ec a s ew i t h
capital taxation, we must impose some restriction on the government’s ability
to tax past investments. Otherwise, the government could trivially reach the
ﬁrst best allocation by conﬁscating part of the existing capital stocks.
3 First best
It is instructive to ﬁrst consider the optimal tax structure when the government
can use a full set of linear taxes. The ﬁrst best solution is obtained by
assuming that the government can directly choose the allocation (or dictate
households’ consumption, savings, and labor-leisure decisions). The ﬁrst best
allocations are determined by the following ﬁrst-order conditions (together
with transversality conditions):
unt + uctfnt =0
uct − βuct+1 (1 + rt+1)=0
βuht+1 − uct + βuct+1 (1 − δh)=0 .
The ﬁrst-order conditions characterizing individually optimal behavior in
(2.7)—(2.10) can be written as
uctηt(1 − τ
n
t )wt + unt =0 (3.1)
uctηt − βuct+1ηt+1Rt+1 =0 (3.2)
βuht+1 − uctηt + βuct+1ηt+1R
h
t+1 =0 . (3.3)
where ηt = 1
1+τc
t.


















When the above tax rates are inserted into the household’s ﬁrst-order
conditions in (3.1)—(3.3), the conditions become identical to the ﬁrst-order
conditions characterizing the ﬁrst best allocation. Hence, if the tax policy in
(3.4)—(3.6) is feasible, the resulting competitive equilibrium will correspond to
the ﬁrst best allocation.
To check under what conditions the proposed tax policy is feasible, we ﬁrst
note that with the tax rates in (3.4)—(3.6), the government budget constraint














r1. Similarly, the budget constraint of the household








where A1 = R1k1 + Rh













pt − T1. (3.7)
Clearly, τ ≤− 1 is not possible in equilibrium. Hence, the above equation may













 > −1. (3.8)
Therefore, we obtain
Result 1 Assuming that condition (3.8) holds, the ﬁrst best allocation can be
achieved with a constant strictly positive tax on consumption, a constant
subsidy on labor income, zero tax on business capital income, and a
strictly positive tax on the imputed rent.
The result closely parallels Result 1 in Coleman (2000). Essentially, the ﬁrst
best solution is a form of a lump-sum tax. As a negative tax on labor income
is a positive tax on leisure, the government can tax all goods and it need
not distort household behavior. We note that the tax treatment of housing is
similar to that of consumption in that they are both taxed at a positive rate
whereas the tax rate on business capital income is zero.12
4R a m s e y p r o b l e m s
In this section, we will consider diﬀerent restrictions on the available tax
instruments. An obvious problem with the ﬁrst best tax scheme is that it
requires subsidizing labor. Such a subsidy would give households an incentive
to misrepresent hours of work. Therefore, we begin the section by analyzing
the case where labor may not be subsidized and maintain this assumption
throughout the section. We also impose the common constraint that the tax
12In order to be consistent with the previous literature on housing taxation, we have
assumed that depreciation of housing is tax deductible. Disallowing the deduction would
simply scale the tax rate on housing downwards. In that case, the ﬁrst best tax rates would
be τc = τh = −τn = τ > 0 and τk =0 .
13rate on business capital income may not exceed unity.13 We consider this as
our benchmark case.
It is also interesting to see how the optimal tax treatment of housing
depends on the availability of a consumption tax. Therefore, we solve the
Ramsey problem also for the case without a consumption tax. In addition, we
consider restrictions on the tax rate on the imputed rent. The extreme case
where housing taxation is ruled out is useful in evaluating the eﬃciency cost
of not taxing housing.
This section consists of four subsections. The ﬁrst subsection presents the
general methodology for solving the government problem in our benchmark
case. The two following subsections discuss three diﬀerent constraints on the
tax instruments: the tax rate on the imputed rent may not exceed unity, taxing
housing is ruled out, and taxing consumption is ruled out. The emphasis in the
presentation is on how the optimal tax reform in the benchmark case changes
with the introduction of additional constraints. The last subsection presents
the implications of the housing tax reform in a small open economy where the
government may not tax the return to international lending.
4.1 No tax on leisure
The problem of the government is to choose the tax policy so as to maximize
the utility of the representative household subject to the aggregate resource
constraint, household’s optimizing behavior, and the constraints imposed on
the tax rates. Following the approach taken in Chamley (1986), Judd (1985),
and others, we start by eliminating prices and tax rates from the government’s
problem. Rewriting the budget constraint of the household in (2.6) using the




uctct + untnt + βuht+1ht+1 − uctηtg2

= uc1η1A1. (4.1)
This is the so-called implementability constraint for the government.
Essentially, it states that the allocation must be compatible with individual
optimization.
As in Coleman (2000), we can now formulate the problem of the
government so that it chooses the consumption tax rates {τc
t}∞
t=1 and the
allocations {ct,n t,k t+1,h t+1}∞
t=1 subject to the aggregate resource constraint,
the implementability constraint, and the constraints on the tax rates. Given
the consumption tax rates and the optimal allocations, the other tax rates are
determined from the household’s ﬁrst-order conditions.
As mentioned above, we require all tax reforms to be such that τk
t+1 ≤ 1.
This is equivalent to Rt+1 ≥ 1. Together with the household’s ﬁrst-order
condition in (3.2), this constraint can be written as
uctηt ≥ βuct+1ηt+1. (4.2)
13Also slightly diﬀerent resctrictions have been imposed in the literature. See eg Atkeson
et al (1999) and Jones et al (1993) for a discussion on the eﬀects of changing the bounds.
14In addition, the government is constrained to set a non-negative tax rate on
labor income. Combining constraint τn
t ≥ 0 with the household’s ﬁrst-order
condition in (3.1) gives the following constraint:
unt + uctηtfnt ≥ 0. (4.3)
















t−1µt(f(kt,n t)+( 1− δk)kt +( 1− δh)ht (4.4)












The ﬁrst constraint is the implementability constraint. The second set of
constraints contains an aggregate resource constraint for each period. The
third and fourth sets of constraints are the restrictions on the tax rates.
For periods t>1, the ﬁrst-order conditions for the government are:14’15
nt : Wnt + Btucnt + µtfnt + ωt (unnt + uctηtfnnt)=0 (4.5)
ct : Wct + Btucct − µt + ωtunct =0 (4.6)
kt+1 : −µt + βµt+1 (1 + rt+1)+βωt+1uct+1ηt+1fnkt+1 =0 (4.7)
ht+1 : βWht+1 + βBt+1ucht+1 − µt + βµt+1(1 − δh) (4.8)
:+ βωt+1unht+1 =0
ηt : ωtfnt − λg2 =0 . (4.9)
where Bt = ωtηtfnt − λg2ηt and
Wnt = unt + λ(uhntht + ucntct + unntnt + unt)
Wct = uct + λ(uhctht + ucctct + uct + unctnt)
Wht = uht + λ(uhhtht + uht + uchtct + unhtnt)
These ﬁrst-order conditions determine, together with the aggregate
resource constraints and the implementability constraint, the allocations
{ct,n t,k t+1,h t+1}∞
t=1, the consumption tax rates {τc
t}∞
t=1,a n dλ, the multiplier
of the implementability constraint. After an allocation has been found, prices
{rt,wt} are determined from equations in (2.2) and (2.3). Finally, the tax rates
on labor income, business capital income, and the imputed rent are determined
from equations in (3.1), (3.2), and (3.3), respectively.
14For presentational purposes, we drop here the constraint in (4.2). One can show that it
can only be binding during the ﬁrst periods of the transition.
15The ﬁrst-order conditions for period 1 will be diﬀerent as period 1 variables
enter the government problem independently of the other period variables through the
implementability constraint.
15Several interesting results may be obtained by inspecting the ﬁrst-order
conditions of the government Ramsey problem. Note ﬁrst that if the constraint
in (4.2) is not binding, the ﬁrst-order condition in (4.9) directly implies that
λg2 = ωtfnt. (4.10)
Since the implementability constraint must be binding, λ>0. Therefore, this
condition requires that if g2 > 0 then ωt > 0 for t>1. Therefore, whenever
the constraint in (4.2) is not binding, the optimal tax system must involve
τn =0 .16
Consider then the optimal tax rate on business capital income. Denote the
steady state value of µt by µ (and similarly for other variables). Then, the
steady state version of condition (4.7) can be written as




In the same manner, in a steady state, the household ﬁrst-order condition that
















Since ω>0, it follows that the long run tax rate on the return to business
capital is negative.
These two results are the same as in Coleman (2000). The tax rate on labor
income should be zero because the consumption tax rate is more eﬃcient. In
addition, given that labor is not taxed it is beneﬁcial to subsidize business
capital accumulation. This is because increased business capital accumulation
increases the marginal productivity of labor. This in turn lowers the cost of
imposing the constraint that labor may not be subsidized.
The government ﬁrst-order conditions with respect to consumption and
housing are somewhat complicated and it turns out that it is not possible to
draw general conclusions. This is because, in general, the signs of Wc, Wh,
and Wn depend on the magnitude of λ, the multiplier of the implementability
constraint.
However, we can characterize these tax rates assuming logarithmic utility
function, as in (2.4).17 Consider ﬁrst the tax rate on consumption. Rewriting
(4.6) using (4.5) and (4.8) gives
un
uc






16If g2 =0 , the condition in (4.10) implies that ωt =0 . But then the government
ﬁrst-order condition in (4.9) is satisﬁed for all allocations and consumption tax rates. In
the absence of transfers, there need not be a unique optimal path of tax rates. This point
is also discussed in Coleman (2000).
17This implies that Wnt = unt + λ(unntnt + unt), Wct = uct,a n dWht = uht.
16where the right hand side is strictly positive. The household ﬁrst-order







Comparison of these two constraints shows that τc > 0.
Let us then analyze the long run tax rate on the imputed rent. Using
equations in (4.6), (4.7) and (4.9), we can write the steady state version of the
ﬁrst-order condition in (4.8) as
uh
uc
− (δh + r)=ωηfnk. (4.12)























By collecting these results, we obtain
Result 2 If the government cannot subsidize labor and gives transfers to the
households, in a steady state
i) the tax rate on labor income is zero.
ii) the tax rate on business capital income is negative.
iii) if the utility function is logarithmic, the tax rate on consumption is strictly
positive and the relationship between the tax rates on the imputed rent,














These results leave open whether the long run tax rate on the imputed rent
should be positive or negative. They do show, however, that the tax rate
on the imputed rent should be higher than the tax rate on business capital
income.
18As in the ﬁrst best, the relationship between the optimal tax rates would be slightly
diﬀerent if we didn’t allow tax deduction of housing depreciation. In that case, we would




174.2 Restrictions on the tax rate on the imputed rent
The optimal tax system considered in the previous subsection may involve very
high tax rates on the imputed rent during the transition. In our quantitative
analysis, we therefore consider how the results change if we impose an upper
bound on the tax rate on the imputed rent. In particular, we require that
τh
t+1 ≤ 1. In addition, in order to assess the importance of taxing the imputed
rent, we consider a tax reform that requires setting τh
t+1 =0in all periods.
The ﬁrst constraint implies that Rh
t+1 ≥ 1 − δh − rt+1. This inequality,
together with the household’s ﬁrst-order condition in (3.3), implies that the
government is constrained to choose allocations that satisfy
uctηt ≥ βuct+1ηt+1 (1 − δh − rt+1)+βuht+1. (4.14)
As long as this constraint is not binding in the steady state, the
characterization of the steady state tax rates remains the same as in Result 2.
The second constraint, τh
t+1 =0 , implies that Rh
t+1 =1 − δh in all
periods. Together with the household’s ﬁrst-order condition it translates into
the following constraint to the government’s problem:
uctηt = βuct+1ηt+1 (1 − δh)+βuht+1. (4.15)
This constraint will be binding also in the long run.19 Now (4.9) becomes
−λg2 + γt+1 − γt(1 − δh)+ωt+1fnt+1 =0
where γ is the Lagrange multiplier on constraint (4.15). Since γ is always
strictly positive, it may be that ω =0 . If this is the case, the condition in
(4.11) implies that τk =0in the long run.
4.3 No consumption taxes
In the previous literature on housing taxation, consumption taxation is
typically ignored altogether. In order to examine the importance of allowing
for consumption taxes, we now impose an additional restriction requiring the
tax rate on consumption to be zero.
The problem of the government now looks very similar to the one above
except that now we do not have the ﬁrst-order conditions related to the
consumption tax rate in (4.9). As a result, we are no longer able to determine
analytically whether the non-negativity constraint on the labor income tax
rate is binding or not.
T h ec a s ew h e r eω>0 is quite cumbersome and not very insightful. Also,
our numerical analysis shows that for a low τc, ω =0 , i.e. labor income should
be taxed. We will therefore discuss here only the case where ω =0 .
19It can be shown that simply setting τh = 0 and ignoring this constraint leads to an
allocation that cannot be decentralized using the remaining instruments. Consequently, this
constraint must be imposed separately and is always binding.
18If ω =0 , the tax rate on labor income is strictly positive.20 In addition,
from the equation in (4.11) it follows that τk =0 .
Again determining the tax rate on housing is more complicated. However,
under logarithmic utility, using the ﬁrst-order conditions in (4.6) and (4.7),
the ﬁrst-order condition in (4.8) can be written as
uht+1
uct+1
− (δh + rt+1)=
−λg2ucct+1 (δh + rt+1)
uct+1
. (4.16)
Combining this with the ﬁrst-order condition of the household
uht+1
uct+1

















By collecting these results, we obtain
Result 3 In the absence of consumption taxation, if the non-negativity
constraint on labor income tax rate is not binding.
i) in a steady state, tax rate on business capital income is zero.
ii) in a steady state, if the utility function is logarithmic, the tax rate on the











iii) if the utility function is logarithmic, in the absence of transfers to the
households, τh
t = τk
t in all periods and both are zero in the steady state.
Thus, when consumption taxes are ruled out, the tax rate on the imputed rent
depends on the amount of transfers from the government to the households.
Only in the special case where there are no transfers, the optimal tax rate on
the imputed rent equals the optimal tax rate on business capital income.
These results clearly indicate that the eﬀective tax rate on housing should
be compared not just to the eﬀective tax rate on business capital income (as
is typically done) but also to the eﬀective tax rate on consumption.
20Ignoring the case where the corner solution is optimal.
194.4 Small open economy
Our motivation to consider a small open economy case are related to tax
competition. Accordingly, we consider a somewhat extreme case where
the government cannot tax capital income from abroad. We focus on our
benchmark case where the government cannot subsidize labor but is allowed
to tax consumption.
The ﬁrst-order conditions of the household are the same as in section 2.2








where r∗ denotes the international interest rate, which is assumed to be
constant over time. The constraint implies that now the international interest
rate and the domestic tax rate on business capital income directly pin down
the marginal productivity of capital.
Apart from the constraint in (4.19), the only diﬀerence to the government
problem in (4.4) is that now the aggregate resource constraint for the economy
is given by
ct+kt+1+bt+1+ht+1 +g1 =( 1−δk)kt+(1−δh)ht+f(kt,n t)+(1+r
∗
t)bt
where bt denotes international bonds.
It is straightforward to show that
Result 4 In a small open economy, if the government cannot subsidize labor
and gives transfers to the households
i) labor income tax rate is zero in all periods.
ii) tax rate on business capital income is negative for all t>1.
iii) if utility is logarithmic, relationship of the tax rate on the imputed rent














These analytical results suggest that, except for the ﬁrst periods, the optimal
tax reform in a small open economy is similar to the one in a closed economy.
5 Quantitative analysis
In this section, we present our numerical results. We begin by explaining
the calibration of the model. We then present the optimal tax reforms and
the corresponding welfare eﬀects in the ﬁrst best and under the diﬀerent
constraints discussed in the previous section. In the last subsection, we
experiment with diﬀerent parameter values to test the robustness of the results.
205.1 Benchmark calibration
In our benchmark calibration, we consider the logarithmic utility function in
(2.4). This utility function is consistent with the fact that US households have
spent a roughly constant fraction of their expenditures in housing over time
even though the relative price of housing has declined. (See eg Kydland, 1995).




where α is the capital share.
We calibrate the model to the US economy. Following previous studies with
a similar set-up, we set the technology parameters at the following values:
α =0 .33, δk =0 .08,δ h =0 .05. We assume that in the initial tax system
τn =0 .27, τc =0 , τh =0 ,a n dτk =0 .5. These tax rates are within the range
of empirical estimates in the literature.21 Given the other parameter values
chosen, these tax rates imply a government revenue-to-total output ratio of
0.21.
Parameters β, αc, αh, g1,a n dg2 are chosen so as to match the following
aggregate targets. 1) Business capital-to-housing ratio k/h =1 . 2) Total
capital-to-total output ratio (k + h)/y =3 .0, where y = kαn1−α +( r + δh)h.
3) Transfers-to-total government spending ratio g2/(g1 + g2)=0 .43.4 )L a b o r
supply n =0 .333. 5) The government budget is balanced and there is no
government debt.
The ﬁrst two of these targets are based on the National Income and Product
Accounts (NIPA). The Fixed Asset Table in NIPA contains private residential
and non-residential assets. We interpret all business capital in the model as
private non-residential assets and all housing capital in the model as private
residential assets. The third target is from the 2004 Economic Report of the
President.22 The fourth target implies that households spend one third of
their time working. The last constraint pins down the sum of g1 and g2. All
parameter values of this benchmark calibration are collected in table 1.
21For the labor income tax rate, see e.g. Mendoza et al (1994). The tax rate on the
imputed rent is in the range of what was estimated by Fullerton (1987) to be the eﬀective
tax rate on housing in the US. In a similar model, Greenwood et al (1995) set the tax rate
on business capital equal to 0.70, arguing that it includes not just taxes but also various
regulatory costs. The tax rate on consumption is typically estimated to be around 0.05 (See
eg Carey and Rabesona, 2004). In order to make it easier to compare the cases with and
without consumption taxes we set it to zero.
22We use Table B-83 to ﬁrst calculate the sum of government consumption expenditures
and transfer payments. We then calculate the average share of transfer payments of this
sum for years 1999—2003.











Government expenditures g1 0.0703
g2 0.0531
5.2 Results
We ﬁrst present the transitional dynamics of the economy in the benchmark
case. Figure 1 shows the paths of the optimal tax rates. The tax rates in the
initial steady state are depicted in the ﬁgure as period 0 tax rates. The tax
rate on labor income, being zero from period one onwards, is not shown in the
ﬁgure.
Figure 1: Optimal tax rates when τn ≥ 0 and τk ≤ 1.



























































































Recall that we require the ﬁrst period tax rates on business capital income and
the imputed rent to remain ﬁxed. In addition, the tax rate on business capital
income is required not to exceed one during the transition. In periods 2 and
3, this constraint is binding. The tax rate on the imputed rent is remarkably
22high during the ﬁrst periods of the transition. The tax rate on consumption
increases immediately. All tax rates converge close to their new steady state
levels in just about ﬁve periods.
Figure 2 below shows the corresponding transitionary dynamics of business
and housing capital stocks, labor supply, and consumption. Again period 0
values refer to the initial steady state.
Figure 2: Transition paths when τn ≥ 0 and τk ≤ 1.




































































Business capital stock increases steadily during the transition towards its
post-reform steady state level which is substantially higher than in the initial
steady state. Housing capital stock ﬁrst decreases after which it increases
towards the new steady state level which is also somewhat higher than the
initial steady state level.23 The labor supply increases ﬁrst since the tax rate
on labor income drops drastically with the announcement of the reform. By
the same token, consumption ﬁrst diminishes following the introduction of the
consumption tax.
Table 2 below shows the optimal tax rates in the diﬀerent cases discussed
above in both the short run and the long run. The ﬁrst four rows present
the tax system which supports the ﬁrst best allocation as explained in section
3. The second case is the benchmark case where we restrict the labor income
tax rate to be non-negative and the business capital income tax rate to be at
most one. In the last three cases, we impose additional constraints on the tax
instruments.
23Of course, the large changes in the two capital stocks are related to the fact there are
no adjustment costs or irreversibility constraints in the model.
23Table 2: Optimal tax rates.
Constraints on Tax rate paths
tax policy year 1 year 2 year 3 year 4 year 5 year 10 year ∞
Case 1 τk 0 . 5 0000 0 0
First best τh 0 6.03 6.23 6.42 6.60 7.30 8.20
τc 3.95 3.95 3.95 3.95 3.95 3.95 3.95
τn -3.95 -3.95 -3.95 -3.95 -3.95 -3.95 -3.95
Case 2 τk 0.5 1.00 1.00 0.73 0.00 -0.01 -0.03
τn ≥ 0 τh 0 2.06 1.66 1.17 0.45 0.47 0.50
and τk ≤ 1 τc 0.56 0.43 0.32 0.25 0.25 0.24 0.23
τn 00000 0 0
Case 3 τk 0.5 0.66 0.52 0.50 0.30 -0.01 -0.03
τn ≥ 0, τk ≤ 1 τh 0 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.78 0.51 0.54
and τh ≤ 1 τc 0.49 0.40 0.34 0.29 0.27 0.26 0.25
τn 00000 0 0
Case 4 τk 0.5 1.0 1.0 0.99 0.88 0.01 0
τc =0 , τn ≥ 0 τh 0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 0.11 0.11
τk ≤ 1 τc 00000 0 0
and τh ≤ 1 τn 0 0.03 0.10 0.17 0.22 0.28 0.28
Case 5 τk 0.5 0.18 0.17 0.15 0.14 0.09 0.00
τh =0 , τn ≥ 0 τh 00000 0 0
τk≤ 1 τc 0.42 0.40 0.38 0.37 0.36 0.31 0.24
τn 0 0.03 0.04 0.05 0.05 0.08 0.12
In the ﬁrst best case, the required subsidy on labor income is very high.
Consequently, all other tax rates are very high as well.
Considering the optimal tax structure in the constrained cases reveals
several important insights about the optimal tax treatment of the imputed rent.
Consider ﬁrst the benchmark case (case 2 in table 2). In the long run, both
the optimal tax rate on the imputed rent and the tax rate on consumption are
relatively high (0.50 and 0.23, respectively), whereas the tax rate on business
capital income is slightly below zero (−0.03). In this example, the optimal tax
treatment of housing appears to be closer to the tax treatment of consumption
than that of business capital.
Inspection of case 4 in table 2 shows that the optimal tax treatment of
housing is very sensitive to whether or not we can freely tax consumption.
The optimal long run tax rate on the imputed rent falls from 0.50 in the
benchmark case to 0.11 when we rule out consumption taxation.
The constraints imposed on the tax rates on business capital income and
the imputed rent inﬂuence always both of these tax rates. In the benchmark
case, the constraint τk ≤ 1 is binding during the ﬁrst periods of the transition.
However, when there is an upper bound on the tax rate on the imputed rent
(case 3 in table 2), also the tax rate on business capital income is set at a lower
level and the constraint τk ≤ 1 is never binding.
Interestingly, ruling out housing taxation altogether (case 5 in table 2)
changes the dynamics of the optimal business capital taxation completely.
The tax rate on business capital income starts diminishing from the very ﬁrst
period after the reform is announced. Furthermore, it now converges to zero
24very slowly.24 In other words, if housing cannot be taxed, the optimal tax rate
on business capital income does not feature the usual dynamics with very high
tax rates in the ﬁrst periods and a rapid convergence to the new steady state
tax rate. This is due to the fact that households have two savings vehicles,
housing and business capital, and the government can tax only one of them.
Ruling out housing taxation also changes the evolution of the labor income
tax rate. Contrary to the case where both forms of saving may be taxed, it is
now optimal to tax labor income.
Our welfare measure is the ‘equivalent consumption variation’. It tells
how much consumption should be increased in the initial steady state so as
to make the household indiﬀerent between the status quo and the tax reform
when leisure and housing choices are kept ﬁxed.25 The overall welfare eﬀect in
table 3 takes household welfare during the transition periods into account. The
steady state gain compares welfare in the initial steady state to the welfare in
the new steady state.
Table 3: Welfare eﬀects of the tax reforms.
Tax reform Overall welfare gain Steady state gain
ﬁrst best 8.8% 28.9%
τn ≥ 0 and τk ≤ 16 .7% 22.2%
τn ≥ 0, τk ≤ 1 and τh ≤ 16 .6% 21.5%
τc =0 , τn ≥ 0, τk ≤ 1 and τh ≤ 14 .7% 15.3%
τh =0 , τn ≥ 0,a n dτk ≤ 14 .7% 19.8%
These welfare results suggest two important conclusions. First, the ability
to tax the return to housing at a very high rate (exceeding 100%) is not
important. Imposing an upper bound of unity to the tax rate on the imputed
rent decreases the overall welfare gain only by one tenth of a percentage point.
This is despite the fact that the optimal tax rate on the imputed rent is indeed
quite high during the ﬁrst periods after the reform. Apparently, very high
initial tax rates on the imputed rent distort households’ resource allocation so
much that the gain from the increased tax revenue remains small. Second, the
ability to tax consumption is important. The overall welfare gain of the tax
reform fall substantially if consumption taxes are ruled out.
The last row presents the welfare gain when housing is not taxed at all.
The overall welfare gain is two percentage points lower than in the benchmark
case where only labor subsidies and conﬁscatorily high capital income taxes
are excluded. This is our preferred measure for the welfare cost of not taxing
housing.
The steady state eﬀects are always much larger than the overall welfare
eﬀect. The post-reform steady state is associated with higher total stock
of capital which is built up by higher saving levels during the transition.
Comparing the steady state gains in the last two cases reveals that in the
long run the welfare cost of not taxing housing is far larger than the welfare
cost of not taxing consumption.
24For instance, we ﬁnd that the tax rate on business capital income is still about 0.04
after 20 periods.
25Of course, the required compensation would be smaller if households were allowed to
reoptimize after receiving the compensation.
255.3 Sensitivity analysis
In this section, we experiment with diﬀerent assumptions about the elasticity
of substitution between consumption, housing, and leisure. In doing so, we
focus on the benchmark case where labor may not be subsidized and the tax
rate on business capital income may not exceed unity.













h < 1 is the weight of housing services in the home production
function. The elasticity of substitution between housing services and leisure is
given by εh = 1
1−γh with γh satisfying γh < 1 and γh  =0 . The utility function
is then given by
u(c,h,n)=
[(θ
ccγc +( 1− θ
c)c∗γc)1/γc]1−σ
1 − σ
,f o rσ>0,σ =1








),f o rσ =1
where 0 <θ
c < 1 is the utility weight of consumption, σ is the inverse of the
intertemporal elasticity of substitution. The elasticity of substitution between
‘home production’ and consumption is given by εc = 1
1−γc with γc satisfying
γc < 1 and γc  =0 .
We will ﬁx σ =1and consider diﬀerent elasticities of substitution εc and
εh.26 For both elasticities, we consider values 2 and 1/2. In all cases, we
calibrate the other preference parameters so as to match the same targets as in
section 5.1 with the same initial tax system and market technology parameters.
The logarithmic utility function employed in section 5.1 is a special case of
the utility function considered here with εc =1and εh =1 . So as to facilitate
comparison of the diﬀerent cases, we also report here the steady state tax rates
under the logarithmic utility. The results on the optimal steady state tax rates
in diﬀerent cases are summarized in table 4.
Table 4. Optimal steady state tax rates under diﬀerent εc and εh.
Steady state tax rates
εc =1 εh =1
εh =2 εh =1 εh =1 /2 εc =2 εc =1 εc =1 /2
τk -0.03 -0.03 -0.02 -0.02 -0.03 -0.02
τh 0.40 0.50 0.64 0.56 0.50 0.39
τc 0.24 0.23 0.22 0.20 0.23 0.26
τn 00 0 00 0
The variation in the degree of substitutability between leisure and housing
services or between home production and consumption has virtually no eﬀect
on the optimal tax rate on business capital income. Also the labor income
tax rate remains unaﬀected as the non-negativity constraint continues to bind.
26We found that diﬀerent reasonable values for σ did not change the results concerning
the optimal long run tax rates substantially.
26In contrast, the long run tax rate on the imputed rent is quite sensitive not
only to the substitutability between leisure and housing services but also the
substitutability between consumption and home production. As the elasticity
of substitution between housing services and leisure falls from 2 to 1/2, the long
run tax rate on the imputed rent increases from 0.40 to 0.64. Similarly, when
εc drops from 2 to 1/2, the optimal tax rate on the imputed rent decreases from
0.56 to 0.39. Variation in the substitutability has a much more modest impact
on the optimal tax rate on consumption. Changes in εh leave the optimal
consumption tax rate almost unaﬀected while a reduction in εc from 2 to 1/2,
increases the optimal consumption tax rate from 0.20 to 0.26.
Table 5 shows the overall welfare eﬀects and steady state welfare eﬀects
under the diﬀerent model speciﬁcations considered above. The upper part
reports the results related to changes in the elasticity of substitution between
housing and leisure when εc =1while the bottom of the table shows the same
results for diﬀerent elasticities between home production and consumption
keeping the substitutability between housing services and leisure ﬁxed at εh =
1.
Table 5: Welfare eﬀects in diﬀerent model speciﬁcations.
Elasticity of substitution Overall welfare gain Steady state gain
εh =2 8 .2% 32.4%
εc =1 εh =1 6 .7% 22.2%
εh =1 /26 .3% 18.4%
εc =2 1 1 .0% 28.5%
εh =1 εc =1 6 .7% 22.2%
εc =1 /25 .1% 21.2%
The table shows a clear pattern in the magnitude of welfare eﬀects: As
the elasticity of substitution increases, the welfare eﬀects also increase. The
rationale is straightforward: When the elasticity of substitution is high, there
exist a lot of scope for substituting leisure for housing services and vice versa.
This means, other things equal, that the distortions created by the initial tax
system grow larger as the substitutability increases. The larger the distortions
in the initial steady state, the bigger will be the welfare gains associated from
moving to the optimal tax structure.
6 Conclusions
We have considered the optimal tax status of housing within a dynamic general
equilibrium model. Our analytical results demonstrate that in general the
optimal tax rate on the imputed rent should not equal the tax rate on the
business capital income. Quantitatively, we found that in the arguably realistic
case where consumption can be taxed but labor cannot be subsidized, both
housing and other consumption should be taxed at relatively high tax rates,
whereas the tax rate on business capital income should be close to zero. In this
sense, our results certainly support the view that the current tax treatment of
housing is far from optimal in most western economies.
27Our experiments with diﬀerent preference parameters reveal that the long
run tax rate on the imputed rent depends on the elasticity of substitution
between leisure (or, alternatively, time spent on homework) and housing: the
lower the elasticity, the higher should be the tax on housing. However, the
general structure of the tax system is not aﬀected by changes in the elasticity.
The model we employed to derive these results is, intentionally, very simple
in many respects. As a next step, it would be interesting to study the optimal
tax treatment of housing with models that involve some more real world
complications. One possibly important extension would be to take land into
account by assuming that housing services are provided by the combination of
land and structures.
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